Last week, the EU failed to agree on its 2040 climate target. Again.
On paper, it’s about numbers—90% emission cuts, 3% carbon credits, the usual technical negotiations. In reality, it’s about something far more fundamental: Europe’s energy system is deeply fragmented.
We call it a “single energy market,” but in practice, we’re running 27 different grid philosophies:
Norway (outside the EU but inside the power market): The most flexible—hydro reservoirs act as Europe’s battery.
Germany: Highly industrial and efficient. Factories stabilize the grid in real time.
Spain: Democratic and transparent grid governance, but limited industrial participation.
France: Stable, centralized, nuclear-heavy. Reliable, but rigid.
Poland: Coal-dominated and still largely inflexible, though renewables are rising fast.
This isn’t bureaucratic theater—it’s why Europe struggles to align on climate ambition. Different economies, different grid logics, different definitions of “flexibility.”
The Coal Question
Coal plants can be flexible. Modernized fleets in Germany and the Czech Republic ramp quickly and operate at partial load. But in Poland and parts of Eastern Europe, old baseload stations were never designed for cycling. Technically possible? Yes. Economically rational? Not even close.
That’s not a physics problem—it’s a policy design problem.
The Missing Link: Industrial Flexibility
Here’s the uncomfortable truth: Europe doesn’t lack renewable generation capacity. It lacks flexible demand.
Without it, we’ll keep curtailing wind and solar while burning gas for balance. Germany’s model—industrial load shifting, hydrogen electrolysis, real-time market signals—shows what’s possible. But most countries still treat industry as a passive consumer, not a grid resource.
Europe’s Green Deal won’t work without flexible industry at its center. Decarbonization isn’t just about cleaner electrons—it’s about smarter, more adaptive consumption.
What the 2040 Debate is Really About
When member states argue over climate targets, they’re really debating how far and how fast their national systems can flex. That’s why a “90% by 2040” goal lands so differently in Berlin, Madrid, Warsaw, or Paris. The technical capacity exists. The political alignment doesn’t.
The Real Challenge
Europe doesn’t have an energy problem—it has an alignment problem. Technical, industrial, and political.
Until we make flexibility a shared European value—not just a national experiment—our climate targets will remain paper promises. And we’ll keep hitting the same paradox everywhere: We have the clean power. We just can’t use it efficiently.
The question for Europe:
How do we build a flexible union that treats industrial demand as a stabilizing force, not a liability? Because without that shift, 2040 will be just another missed target with better PowerPoint slides.
What’s your take on Europe’s flexibility challenge?